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Abstract The phrase \add them up and divide by two (Tashite Ni De Waru, in Japanese)" is an established
maxim in Japanese society, and has its historical roots in Japanese culture. This means adopting a middle
course between two competing proposals in order to avoid a conict. In the spirit of Max Weber (1949), this
paper establishes a systematically correct scientic proof of \add them up and divide by two" (Add-Div),
by using conceptions of the two OR methodologies, data envelopment analysis (DEA) and cooperative game
theory. More specically, in the DEA game scheme of Nakabayashi and Tone (2006), we study an allocation
problem with two criteria, in which game-theoretic solutions such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus
prove coincident with the result of the Add-Div method. While today some brilliant minds may propose
that people should abandon the Add-Div mentality, this paper enables one to re-consider the concept of
Add-Div not only as a matter of mentality but also as an application of OR methods. We also illustrate
the use of the Add-Div concept where the \assurance region" (AR) method of DEA is incorporated.
Keywords: DEA, cooperative game theory, Shapley value, nucleolus, assurance region
method, allocation problem, social choice problem
1. Introduction
Let us begin with citing The Doctrine of the Mean by Confucius, who is the most famous
ancient Chinese sage, philosopher and political theorist.
“The superior man embodies the course of the Mean; the mean man acts contrary
to the course of the Mean.”
“There was Shun [who is the legendary ideal emperor of ancient China]: – He
indeed was greatly wise!... He took hold of their two extremes, determined the
Mean, and employed it in his government of the people. It was by this that he
was Shun!... Men all say, ‘We are wise;’ but being driven forward and taken in a net,
a trap, or a pitfall, they know not how to escape. Men all say, ‘We are wise;’ but
happening to choose the course of the Mean, they are not able to keep it for a round
month.” ([7], p.386 and p.388)
Here, we see that both the importance and diﬃculty of the political philosophy of the
‘Golden Mean’ have been recognized in China since the ﬁfth century BC. Then, how can we
practice the Doctrine of the Mean? Let us now consider arithmetically this matter: What
would we do if we want to arithmetically determine the Mean between two extremes? One
good method would be to add them up and divide by two. Interestingly, “add them up
and divide by two (Tashite Ni De Waru, in Japanese)” is an established maxim in Japanese
society. The phrase “Tashite Ni De Waru” has often been used for the mentality of the
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Japanese people, who prefer to adopt a compromise proposal between competing interests
in order to avoid a conﬂict. For example, Shinji Fukukawa [4], who is an executive advisor
of the Dentsu Inc. and a former administrative vice-minister of International Trade and
Industry, said:
“...the Japanese value system may deter the honing of political leadership. Pol-
itics are the mirror of a nation. As a historical example, the 17-article constitution
compiled by Prince Shotoku [who was a regent and a politician in ancient Japan] in
the eighth [seventh] century taught ‘harmony is the chief virtue and confrontation
should be avoided.’ Given Japan’s roots as an agricultural society, harmony and co-
operation among families and villagers were important to ensure rich harvests and
enjoy a stable life....
An ‘add-them-up-and-divide-by-two’ mentality often has prevailed over a logic-
based method of resolving any societal confrontations. As long as people themselves
tend to avoid clear-cut solutions, politicians also are likely to do so.”
We see here that “add them up and divide by two” (hereafter cited as Add-Div) has
its historical roots in Japanese culture. In the meantime, Fukukawa seems to have an
unfavorable opinion about the Add-Div mentality of the Japanese people. Today, there
are not a few cases where brilliant minds propose that people should abandon the Add-Div
mentality, but on the other hand, there are some who hold a positive view of Add-Div as the
application of social equality. Thus, diﬀerent individuals can have totally diﬀerent values of
Add-Div.
Under the circumstances, we agree with Max Weber [19] in thinking that the confusion
between the scientiﬁc discussion of social phenomena and their evaluation should be avoided
in the social sciences. In this sense, it is a very important task to establish a scientiﬁc proof
of Add-Div, which can be acknowledged as systematically correct by people who seek the
truth all over the world. In this paper, therefore, we attempt to develop a scientiﬁc theory
of Add-Div, by using conceptions of the two OR methodologies, data envelopment analysis
(DEA) and cooperative game theory. This enables us to re-consider the concept of Add-Div
not only as a matter of mentality but also as an application of OR methods.
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 explains the DEA game scheme of
Nakabayashi and Tone [10], and in this scheme Section 3 formulates theorems of Add-Div.
We here show that the Add-Div method can be rationalized as game-theoretic solutions
such as the Shapley value and the nucleolus. In Section 4, we illustrate the use of the Add-
Div concept where the “assurance region” (AR) method of DEA is incorporated. Finally,
Section 5 concludes with some remarks.
2. Explanation of the DEA Game Scheme
This section explains the DEA game scheme of Nakabayashi and Tone [10], before we proceed
to the formulation of theorems of Add-Div.
2.1. Problem
In the DEA game scheme, we deal with the problem of fairly allocating a certain amount
of divisible goods or burdens among individuals or organizations. The so-called allocation
problem has many economic and social examples. Also, “political science be described as
the study of the authoritative allocation of values for a society,” says Easton [3] (p.129). He
adds:
“...from time immemorial men have been asking questions that lead them to seek
an understanding of the way values are authoritatively allocated, this has not been
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just a matter of accident. A minimum condition for the existence of any society is
the establishment of some mechanisms, however crude or inchoate, for arriving at
authoritative social decisions about how goods, both spiritual and material, are to be
distributed,...” ([3], p.135)
Here, we see that the problem of how to determine the (authoritative) allocation is
classical in nature, and has long been seen to be common to all societies. In the literature
on cooperative game theory, there have been many applications to allocation problems. In
the DEA game scheme, we can deal with these problems, especially under multi-criteria
environment. It is not generally a diﬃcult task to solve the allocation problem if only one
criterion is applied; but the society is often faced with multiple criteria for determining the
allocation. Three examples will suﬃce to show this.
1. Market arcade problem
One shopping mall association in Japan made the following agreement on the arcade
maintenance fee: “Every shop facing the arcade street has to pay a monthly fee. The
method for arriving at this fee for each shop was discussed and approved at the general
meeting. Share of cost was determined based on parameters such as category of business,
the size of the shop, the number of employees, and so on.”
2. Local tax grants system
Japan’s local tax grants have been allocated mostly based on the shortfalls in local
government ﬁnances. An advisory committee established by a Minister for Public Man-
agement, Home Aﬀairs, Posts and Telecommunications in 2006 proposed a new tax
grants system, under which grants should be allocated basically based on each prefec-
ture’s population and area. The proposal is still controversial among the concerned
people.
3. Apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations (UN)
The member states of the UN have to pay an annual membership fee to maintain
international security. The scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses
is based on parameters such as gross national product (GNP), external debt, per capita
income, and so on. In the UN General Assembly, the representatives of the member
states discussed, based on the aforementioned parameters, various ideas about how to
estimate the expenses in order to arrive at a single comprehensive scheme. Collectively
they are framed within a set of potential parameters, whereas individually they express
diﬀerent opinions on the importance of various parameters. Tadokoro [15] summed up
the UN discussion as follows: “The decision-making process of the General Assembly
on the methodology for estimating share of expense often appears to be a political
battle, in that each member state supports its favorite measures so as to minimize its
own share.” “The member states may attempt to minimize their own costs, but there
are restraints on what they can claim because they have a discussion of an acceptable
scheme commonly applied to all of them.” ([15], p.131 and p.132)
In the above examples, the societies have taken the trouble to apply two or more criteria
to determine the allocation. Probably, one reason is that it is diﬃcult to make a fair
judgment based on just one criterion, and another reason is that the concerned people have
diﬀerent opinions on the methods for estimating an eﬃcient/equitable sharing. This issue
is essentially related to priority, which is a class of conceptions of equity, as mentioned by
Young [21].
“More often priority is based on a mixture of criteria.... Priority in these situa-
tions is not one-dimensional, it involves trade-oﬀs among various principles.”
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“In this case fairness reduces to a procedural question of how to strike an equitable
balance between diverse points of view. This brings us to a classical problem in group
decision making, namely, how to design a process that fairly aggregates individual
opinions into a collective decision.” ([21], p.14 and p.15)
The problem we treat in the DEA game scheme belongs to what Young called priority.
“This is,” says Young [21] (pp.35-36), “the opinion aggregation or social choice problem, and
it is not a simple one.”
2.2. Mathematical modeling
Let us assume n players who have m criteria (or m policy proposals) for deciding about
how goods are to be distributed. Their society is faced with a choice among m criteria.
Criterion i (i = 1, ,m) assigns the share xij 2 (0,1) to player j (j = 1, ,n). The
vector (xi1,xi2, ,xin) denotes the apportionment assigned by Criterion i, and therefore,
it holds that
∑n
j=1 xij = 1 (i = 1, ,m). The score matrix can be arranged in Table 1.
Table 1: The score matrix
Player
1 2  n Sum
Criterion (Proposal) 1 x11 x12  x1n 1
Criterion (Proposal) 2 x21 x22  x2n 1
     
     
Criterion (Proposal) m xm1 xm2  xmn 1
We now consider the following two mathematical programming problems for player j:
c(fjg) = max
{
m ∑
i=1
wixij
     
   
m ∑
i=1
wi = 1,wi  0 (i = 1, ,m)
}
(2.1)
= maxfx1j,x2j, ,xmjg,
and
d(fjg) = min
{
m ∑
i=1
wixij
     
   
m ∑
i=1
wi = 1,wi  0 (i = 1, ,m)
}
(2.2)
= minfx1j,x2j, ,xmjg,
where w = (w1, ,wm) is a vector of weights assigned to the criteria.
Player j’s share is not more than c(fjg) and not less than d(fjg), irrespective of what
proposal is authoritatively selected in the society.
Toward the “opinion aggregation problem,” we now think about an “aggregation” of
players. Let a coalition S be a subset of the player set N = f1, ,ng. The coalition S’s
total share is calculated by
xi(S) =
∑
j2S
xij (i = 1, ,m). (2.3)
Similar to an individual player, the following two problems can be considered:
c(S) = max
{
m ∑
i=1
wixi(S)
 
     
 
m ∑
i=1
wi = 1,wi  0 (i = 1, ,m)
}
(2.4)
= maxfx1(S),x2(S), ,xm(S)g,
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and
d(S) = min
{
m ∑
i=1
wixi(S)
 
     
 
m ∑
i=1
wi = 1,wi  0 (i = 1, ,m)
}
(2.5)
= minfx1(S),x2(S), ,xm(S)g.
Coalition S’s share is not more than c(S) and not less than d(S), irrespective of what
proposal is authoritatively selected in the society.
Thus, we have two types of characteristic function games (N,c) and (N,d). Nakabayashi
and Tone [10] called them the DEA max and min games, because the DEA’s fundamen-
tal concept of “variable weights” is the absolute basis of the mathematical programming
problems (2.1), (2.2), (2.4) and (2.5). Refer to Cooper et al. [1] (pp.12-13) for a detailed
explanation on this variable weights issue.
2.3. Possible cooperation among players in the game
We here discuss possible cooperation among players in the DEA game. If a speciﬁc player
has the authority to determine the allocation, his/her favorite proposal will be adopted in
the society. But we consider a case where the authority is not clearly vested in a speciﬁc
player. All the three examples given in Section 2.1 can illustrate such a case. For a player
without the authority the policy is indeterminate, i.e., the player is unsure what policy
proposal is authoritatively selected in the society. In the case of beneﬁt-sharing DEA game,
player j’s optimistic calculation predicts that he/she obtains a beneﬁt of at most c(fjg),
whereas his/her pessimistic calculation predicts that he/she obtains a beneﬁt of at least
d(fjg). (The functions c,d are reversed in the case of cost-sharing.) We now consider the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 (Nakabayashi and Tone [10])
d(S) + c(N   S) = 1, 8S  N. (2.6)
This proposition implies that d(S) and c(N   S) originate from the same zero-sum (or
ﬁxed-sum) two-person game. This may embody the concept conceived by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [11] (p.238): The game is played by the coalition S against the coalition
N   S for a share of the pie. The most favorable decision for the coalition N   S coincides
with the pessimistic expectation of the coalition S. It oﬀers an analogy for a polarization
between political friend and foe.
Let us now assume two players i and j (i,j 2 N) who calculate their payoﬀs based
on their pessimistic criteria: – “This criterion of pessimism or Wald criterion, named for
Abraham Wald who suggested it, minimizes the risk involved in making a decision.” ([18],
p.26) Player i expects to obtain (from the coalition N   fig) a beneﬁt of at least d(fig),
and player j expects to obtain (from the coalition N   fjg) a beneﬁt of at least d(fjg).
Then we consider the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 (Nakabayashi and Tone [10]) The characteristic function d is super-
additive, i.e., for any S  N and T  N with S \ T = ϕ, we have
d(S [ T)  d(S) + d(T). (2.7)
If two players i and j combine together, the sum of their guaranteed payoﬀs can be
increased, i.e., d(fi,jg)  d(fig)+d(fjg). Thus, cooperation among players can be expected
when we assume that the players in the game follow their pessimistic inclinations and
attempt to minimize their risks.
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2.4. The DEA game scheme as an OR tool
We here think about a grand coalition and have the following proposition.
Proposition 2.3 (Nakabayashi and Tone [10])
c(N) = d(N) = 1. (2.8)
The Shapley value [14] and the nucleolus [13] as the representative imputations of coop-
erative game satisfy grand coalition rationality, and hence, in these game-theoretic solutions
of the games (N,c) and (N,d), the sum of imputed payoﬀs of all players is equal to 1. We
can apply them to the problem of how to determine the allocation.
As long as players follow their optimistic inclinations and assert their claims based on
their favorite criteria, cooperation may not be expected. One might think that the solution
concept of cooperative game is inapplicable to the case. We think, however, the DEA game
solution is potentially useful even if there is practically a lack of cooperation. The main
reason is that the non-cooperation condition may be only a temporary one. Our view is that
a person’s inclination is practically variable. Even if a player shows an optimistic and self-
centered attitude, it is diﬃcult for the player without the authority to be completely outside
his/her pessimistic frame of mind. An evaluator is permitted to assume a pessimistic and
rational player in the game-theoretic model to reach a rational conclusion. We also think
a person’s inclination is controllable to some extent in a society. For example, once it is
authoritatively decided that player’s share is estimated based on unfavorable criteria for the
player, the decision raises the player’s pessimistic expectation.
The classical deﬁnition of Operations Research by Morse and Kimball [9] (p.1) is “a
scientic method of providing executive departments with a quantitative basis for decisions
regarding the operations under their control.” Suppose an executive department has the
problem of how to determine a reasonable allocation based on multiple criteria. Then, an
OR worker may analyze the problem, by using the DEA game scheme as an OR tool, on the
assumption that players in the game follow their pessimistic inclinations that can provide a
quantitative basis for the practical decision.
3. Formulation of Theorems of Add-Div
This section deals with a case in which a society is faced with a choice between two criteria
for deciding about how goods are to be distributed. In the DEA game scheme we analyze
the two-criterion case, and prove that game-theoretic solutions such as the Shapley value
and the nucleolus are coincident with the result of the Add-Div method.
3.1. On dealing with the two-criterion case
There are inﬁnite possibilities for estimating share of goods, and therefore, one might think
that the two-criterion case, which we are treating here, is not so important. On the contrary,
we think the two-criterion case is important because this case is not a rare occurrence, which
we now explain below.
Assume a society of M members where each proposes a most desirable way of allocating
the goods. Then, the total number of proposals is M, i.e., a ﬁnite number. There will
be overlap among their proposals, and these proposals are usually further screened in the
decision-making process. Even if one of the members tries to push forward an excessive
claim, the society (or the other members with some authority of society) can exclude it
from the consideration. Thus, the agenda usually focuses on a few alternatives that they
consider to be important in consensus-making. Through such a screening and selection
process, a two-criterion case can emerge.
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Another process is possible. Whenever a counterproposal is placed on the agenda, the
society is faced with a choice between two alternatives, i.e., the current policy and the
proposed one.
A formulation of the above processes is the task for a separate study, i.e., we here study
the case in which there are two criteria. We think this problem is important because our
experiences in OR practice (and everyday life) show that a set of two alternatives in decision
or evaluation problems is actually frequent rather than rare.
3.2. The Shapley value of bicriteria DEA game
The Shapley value [14] is a representative solution concept of cooperative game. We here
demonstrate that the Shapley solution of bicriteria DEA game is the same as the result of
the Add-Div method.
The Shapley value for the game (N,d) is deﬁned by ϕj(d) as
ϕj(d) =
∑
S:j2SN
(s   1)!(n   s)!
n!
fd(S)   d(S   fjg)g, (3.1)
where s is the number of members of coalition S. We ﬁrst introduce the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Nakabayashi and Tone [10]) The Shapley values of the DEA max and
min games (N,c) and (N,d) are the same.
In a two-criterion case, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 In a two-criterion case, the game (N, c+d) is additive, i.e., for every S  N,
it holds that
c(S) + d(S) =
∑
j2S
c(fjg) +
∑
j2S
d(fjg). (3.2)
Proof : Since c(fjg) + d(fjg) = x1j + x2j (8j 2 N) and c(S) + d(S) = x1(S) + x2(S)
(8S  N), we have
c(S) + d(S) = x1(S) + x2(S)
=
∑
j2S
(x1j + x2j)
=
∑
j2S
(c(fjg) + d(fjg))
=
∑
j2S
c(fjg) +
∑
j2S
d(fjg).
Note that Lemma 3.1 does not hold for cases involving three or more criteria.
We now have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (Add-Div Theorem I) In a two-criterion case, for any player k, the Shap-
ley values ϕk(c) and ϕk(d) are given by
ϕk(c) = ϕk(d) =
c(fkg) + d(fkg)
2
. (3.3)
Proof : By the Shapley’s additivity axiom, it holds that ϕk(c + d) = ϕk(c) + ϕk(d), and it
follows from Theorem 3.1 that ϕk(c) = ϕk(d). Hence,
ϕk(c) = ϕk(d) =
1
2
ϕk(c + d). (3.4)
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From Lemma 3.1 we have c(S) + d(S)   c(S   fkg)   d(S   fkg) = c(fkg) + d(fkg)
(8S  N), and then it holds that
ϕk(c + d) = c(fkg) + d(fkg). (3.5)
We have, by (3.4) and (3.5),
ϕk(c) = ϕk(d) =
c(fkg) + d(fkg)
2
.
Thus, we see that the Shapley value for two-criterion cases can be obtained by applying
the simple decision rule – namely, “add them up and divide by two.”
Let us now review what Littlechild and Owen [8] in 1973 mentioned: “In the twenty years
since its proposal, the Shapley value has received surprisingly few applications. Perhaps, one
reason is the diﬃculty of computing it for large games.” If there was another bottleneck in
the implementation of the solution concept for cooperative game, it would be the diﬃculty
of constructing the characteristic function in real-life problems. Littlechild and Owen [8]
constructed the function in the real-life problem, which yields “a simple expression for the
Shapley value.” Their study has signiﬁcantly contributed to the application of game theory.
In the DEA game scheme the problems are given computationally implementable form, and
also the analysis here has shown a real-world situation where we have “a simple expression
for the Shapley value.” This should be said with some emphasis.
We show in the following example that the Shapley value for the three-criterion case
cannot be obtained by applying the simple decision rule.
[Example 3.1]
Table 2 exhibits a DEA game of three players with three criteria. Also, the bottom line
of Table 2 shows the average of the vectors on the three individual criteria. Table 3
exhibits the characteristic function values of the individual players for the max and min
games, and the average of them. We obtain the Shapley value of this game, as shown in
Table 4. The Shapley value is very diﬀerent from the average vectors in Tables 2 and 3.
3.3. The nucleolus of bicriteria DEA game
The nucleolus [13] as well as the Shapley value is a well-known solution concept of cooper-
ative game. Kohlberg [5] introduced, in his Theorem 2, a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for a payoﬀ vector x to be the nucleolus of a characteristic function v. By using his results,
we here demonstrate that the nucleolus solution of bicriteria DEA game is the same as the
result of the Add-Div method.
Let us introduce a couple of deﬁnitions established in [5].
Table 2: A three-person and three-criterion game
Player
A B C Sum
Criterion 1 0.25 0.3 0.45 1
Criterion 2 0.5 0.25 0.25 1
Criterion 3 0.125 0.5 0.375 1
Average 0.292 0.35 0.358 1
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Table 3: Max and min values of the individual players
Player
A B C Sum
Max values 0.5 0.5 0.45 1.45
Min values 0.125 0.25 0.25 0.625
Average 0.3125 0.375 0.35 1.0375
Table 4: The Shapley value
Player
A B C Sum
Shapley value 0.3 0.3625 0.3375 1
Denition 3.1 (Kohlberg [5]) Let b0,b1, ,bp be a sequence of sets whose elements are
coalitions of N. This sequence is a coalition array whenever:
(i) every coalition of N is contained in exactly one of the sets b1, ,bp,
(ii) b0 contains only one-element coalitions.
For every game (N,v) and every payoﬀ vector x = (x1, ,xn) with x(N) = v(N), let
b1(x,v) be the set of those S  N for which
maxfv(S)   x(S) : S  Ng
is attained. Similarly, b2(x,v) is the set of those S  N where
maxfv(S)   x(S) : S / 2 b1(x,v)g
is attained, and so on. Finally, let b0(x) = ffig : xi = 0g. It is obvious that b0(x), b1(x,v),
, bp(x,v) is a coalition array. We shall say that it is the array that belongs to (v,x).
Denition 3.2 (Kohlberg [5]) A coalition array b0, ,bp has property I if for all k =
1,2, ,p and any y = (y1, ,yn),
(1) y(S)  0 for all S 2 b0,
(2) y(S)  0 for all S 2 b1 [  [ bk, and
(3) y(N) = 0
imply
(4) y(S) = 0 for all S 2 b1 [  [ bk.
Now we are ready to consider our main problem. In DEA games with two criteria, deﬁne
a payoﬀ vector z = (z1, ,zn) such that
zk =
c(fkg) + d(fkg)
2
(k = 1, ,n). (3.6)
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2
d(S)   z(S) = d(N   S)   z(N   S).
Proof : For any S  N, using Lemma 3.1 we have
d(S)   z(S) = d(S)  
∑
j2S
c(fjg) + d(fjg)
2
= d(S)  
c(S) + d(S)
2
=
d(S)   c(S)
2
,
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and
d(N   S)   z(N   S) = d(N   S)  
∑
j2N S
c(fjg) + d(fjg)
2
=
d(N   S)   c(N   S)
2
.
From Proposition 2.1, we have d(S) c(S) = d(N  S) c(N  S). Hence, it holds that
d(S)   z(S) = d(N   S)   z(N   S).
We also have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 The coalition array that belongs to (d,z) has property I.
Proof : The proof is by contradiction. Assume the assertion were false. Then we could have
9y = (y1, ,yn) such that for 9k, y satisﬁes (1), (2) and (3) of Deﬁnition 3.2, and for
9S 2 b1 [  [ bk, y(S) > 0.
From Lemma 3.2, N  S as well as S is contained in b1 [[bk, and the condition (2)
follows that y(N   S)  0. Hence, it holds that y(S) + y(N   S) > 0. This contradicts the
condition (3), and the proof is completed.
In a similar manner, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4 The coalition array that belongs to (c,z) has property I.
Kohlberg [5] demonstrated that a payoﬀ vector x is the nucleolus of v if and only if the
coalition array that belongs to (v,x) has property I. Hence, from Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, z is
the nucleolus of both c and d, and we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 (Add-Div Theorem II) In a two-criterion case, the nucleolus solutions of
games (N,c) and (N,d) for player k are given by
c(fkg) + d(fkg)
2
.
In Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, we can rationalize the Add-Div method as the solution concepts
of cooperative game.
We have the following example that the nucleolus for the three-criterion case cannot be
obtained by applying the simple decision rule.
[Example 3.2]
The nucleolus allocations of both the max game (N,c) and the min game (N,d) for the
data set in Table 2 are (0.3125, 0.36875, 0.31875) and (0.275, 0.375, 0.35), respectively.
Both nucleolus allocations are diﬀerent from the average vectors in Tables 2 and 3, and
from the Shapley value in Table 4.
As shown in Examples 3.1 and 3.2, the “add them up and divide by three” method
cannot be rationalized as a solution concept of cooperative game.
4. Incorporating the AR Method
In the preceding section the theorems of Add-Div were formulated and proved, although the
Add-Div method has recently been questioned by many people. This section begins with
looking at a case in which the Add-Div method will be criticized. We see why the Add-Div
method is so problematic to many people and illustrate the use of the Add-Div concept
where the “assurance region” (AR) method of DEA is incorporated.
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4.1. The need for the thoughtful and careful use
Let us consider the following quotation from Kyogoku [6] (p.120):
“In many cases, the mass media will criticize the monetary amounts that have been
set on the ground that they are ad hoc unprincipled (add up and divide by two)
decisions that are not based on long-term considerations.”
In many political cases, decisions should certainly be based on long-term considerations.
Hence, the thoughtless and indiscriminate use of the Add-Div method must be avoided.
Meanwhile, the serious problem is that in taking long-term considerations into account,
there will be various criteria for evaluating a policy. When members of a democratic society
have diﬀerent criteria for the evaluation, the principle of social equality becomes necessary
in some cases where the DEA game scheme is potentially useful. We think it is important to
try to ﬁnd out the thoughtful and careful use of the DEA game scheme. When considering
the use of it as a means of supporting group decision-making, the group members should talk
long over the direction of their common policy and choose proper criteria. Inappropriate
criteria must be excluded from the consideration.
They may wish to ﬁnd only one proper criterion, but there are two or more criteria in
some cases. In order to build a consensus, they will sometimes need to try to ﬁnd a common
acceptable range for weights of the criteria. In this connection, Takamura and Tone [16]
attempted decision analyses for a national project in Japan, by using the “assurance region”
(AR) model of DEA. Their study shows that the AR method is so useful in the process of
reaching a consensus. Nakabayashi and Tone [10] presented the DEA game where the
AR method was incorporated, which is also potentially useful in the process of reaching
a consensus. The following subsection illustrates the use of the AR DEA game with two
criteria and demonstrates that Add-Div Theorems hold in the AR case, too.
4.2. Illustration of the use of the AR DEA game
Let us assume three players who assert their claims to limited goods. Concerned people
discuss how to estimate share of the goods and ﬁnally choose the two criteria that deﬁne
the data matrix exhibited in Table 5. From Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, we have the solution of
this DEA game in the bottom line of Table 5, as (0.375,0.275,0.35).
Table 5: A three-person and two-criterion game
Player
A B C Sum
Criterion 1 0.25 0.3 0.45 1
Criterion 2 0.5 0.25 0.25 1
Average 0.375 0.275 0.35 1
We further assume all the concerned people agree that Criterion 1 is more important
than Criterion 2 in consensus-making. (But, at the same time they cannot completely reject
Criterion 2.) The consensus holds that the solution (0.375,0.275,0.35) needs to be revised,
because this solution means the two criteria are of equal value, in spite of the commonly
agreed ranking of criteria. Every player in the game should not be free to choose his/her
weights, and the region of weights must be limited to some special area. We here can
apply the following method called “assurance region” (AR), originally developed in DEA
literature, e.g., Thompson et al. [17].
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Let w = (w1,w2) be a vector of weights assigned to the criteria. We now set a constraint
on the ratio w2 over w1 as follows:
u 
w2
w1
 l,
where u and l denote the upper and lower bounds of the ratio w2/w1. These bounds must
be set in agreement among the concerned people. In this AR case, programs (2.4) and (2.5)
are, respectively, modiﬁed as
c(S) = max
w w1
∑
j2S
x1j + w2
∑
j2S
x2j (4.1)
subject to w1 + w2 = 1
u 
w2
w1
 l
w1,w2  0,
and
d(S) = min
w w1
∑
j2S
x1j + w2
∑
j2S
x2j (4.2)
subject to w1 + w2 = 1
u 
w2
w1
 l
w1,w2  0.
For all S  N, the values of objective functions c(S) and d(S) are, respectively, computed
by the following formulae:
c(S) = max
{∑
j2S x1j + u
∑
j2S x2j
1 + u
,
∑
j2S x1j + l
∑
j2S x2j
1 + l
}
, (4.3)
and
d(S) = min
{∑
j2S x1j + u
∑
j2S x2j
1 + u
,
∑
j2S x1j + l
∑
j2S x2j
1 + l
}
. (4.4)
We now have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 In a bicriteria DEA game, Lemma 3.1 holds even if the AR method is incor-
porated into the game.
Proof : We can demonstrate this lemma as follows:
c(S) + d(S) =
∑
j2S x1j + u
∑
j2S x2j
1 + u
+
∑
j2S x1j + l
∑
j2S x2j
1 + l
=
∑
j2S
(
x1j + ux2j
1 + u
+
x1j + lx2j
1 + l
)
=
∑
j2S
(c(fjg) + d(fjg))
=
∑
j2S
c(fjg) +
∑
j2S
d(fjg).
Since Lemma 3.1 is crucial for the proofs of both Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, we have now,
using Lemma 4.1, the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.1 (Add-Div Theorem III) In a bicriteria DEA game, both Theorems 3.2
and 3.3 hold even if the AR method is incorporated into the game.
This theorem demonstrates that even if the AR method is incorporated into the DEA
games, both the Shapley value and the nucleolus for two-criterion cases can be obtained by
applying the simple decision rule – namely, “add them up and divide by two.”
In general the solution of bicriteria AR DEA game is obtained by
c(fkg) + d(fkg)
2
=
1
2
(
x1k + ux2k
1 + u
+
x1k + lx2k
1 + l
)
. (4.5)
If we set
t =
1
2
(
1
1 + u
+
1
1 + l
)
, (4.6)
then we have
c(fkg) + d(fkg)
2
= tx1k + (1   t)x2k. (4.7)
Thus, the determination of the bounds u and l is reduced to the determination of a
parameter t. The range of t is from 0 to 1, with u,l 2 [0,1).
4.3. A numerical example
We are now applying the AR method to the game exhibited in Table 5. When all the
concerned people agree that Criterion 1 is more important than Criterion 2, we should set
the constraint 1  w2/w1 (and do not require the lower bound). Substitute the values u = 1
and l = 0 into the equation (4.6), and then we have t = 0.75. By (4.7), we obtain the
solution of this AR DEA game in the bottom line of Table 6. While Player A was ranked
higher than Player C before the AR method is applied, Player C ranks ﬁrst in this AR case
because Criterion 1 is considered to be more important (Player C has the highest score on
Criterion 1).
Table 6: AR DEA game solution
Player
A B C Sum
Criterion 1 (C1) 0.25 0.3 0.45 1
Criterion 2 (C2) 0.5 0.25 0.25 1
0:75  C1 + 0:25  C2 0.3125 0.2875 0.4 1
Figure 1 shows a simple sensitivity analysis. The choice of the bounds u,l or the pa-
rameter t can have an impact on the ranking of the players, and so the careful choice is
needed.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have ﬁtted the notion described in the Japanese maxim “add them up
and divide by two (Tashite Ni De Waru, in Japanese)” into an OR framework using two
methodologies, DEA and cooperative game theory. Today some brilliant minds may propose
that people should abandon the “add them up and divide by two” (Add-Div) mentality.
Such a proposal forces people to choose whether or not to abandon it. However, this paper
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Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis
enables people to re-consider the concept of Add-Div not only as a matter of mentality but
also as an application of OR methods. People can make a choice among various OR tools
for decision-making, including the Add-Div method, depending on the nature of the case,
and employ it sensibly.
To develop the theory of Add-Div, we used the two main concepts, DEA’s fundamental
concept of variable weights and the solution concept for cooperative game. More speciﬁcally,
the Add-Div theory is based on the two major assumptions, (1) It does not judge the
relative importance of the criteria in advance; (2) The principle of equal treatment for all
the players and potential coalitions is embodied in the solution. The presence of these
theoretical assumptions facilitates an explicit comparison of diﬀerent conclusions that ﬂow
from diﬀerent assumptions. (As an extreme example, a decision by a dictatorial player who
has a one-sided viewpoint will be very diﬀerent from the solution concept of the DEA game.)
Furthermore, we need to study the possibility of other scientiﬁc proofs of Add-Div, e.g., by
using the axiomatic theory of bargaining.
In this paper, we have also seen why the Add-Div method is so problematic to many
people. One reason could be that the Add-Div decision may not be based on long-term
considerations, and therefore, the thoughtless and indiscriminate use of the Add-Div method
must be avoided. Concerned people have to talk among themselves to carefully choose proper
criteria. They can easily arrive at a decision if they ﬁnd only one proper criterion, but there
are two or more criteria in some cases. In the case of three or more criteria no game-
theoretic proof will be given for a simple decision rule, whereas as shown in our analysis, if
their discussion focuses on just two criteria, they can make a rational and simple decision
by the Add-Div method; however, limiting the number of criteria to two is not always easy.
The diﬃculty of the Doctrine of the Mean may lie in ‘taking hold of their two extremes’
rather than in ‘determining the Mean.’
In the spirit of Takamura and Tone [16], this paper has discussed the use of the AR DEA
game that is potentially useful in the process of reaching a consensus. Takamura and Tone
[16] developed a consensus-making scheme by using not only the AR DEA model but also a
number of other methods such as Inverted DEA [20], analytic hierarchy process (AHP) [12]
and the Delphi method. Tone actually applied this scheme step by step to the Japanese
Council and ﬁnally formed a consensus among 19 Council members. When dealing with
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a multi-person, multi-criteria evaluation problem, we may need to employ a combination
of several diﬀerent methods, and in a practical way, even more importantly, to incorporate
various ideas into a cooperative framework for the search of a consensus.
Finally, we would like to point out another possible reason why the Add-Div method is so
problematic to people. The following is a quotation from [2]: “Without a clear philosophy,
no one will follow suit. Because Japanese always add one plus one and then divide by
two.” Our study has applied both DEA and cooperative game theory to the problem, and
has established an OR philosophy that lies at the base of Add-Div. We hope this study
facilitates the re-consideration of the Add-Div concept and encourages its thoughtful and
careful use to resolve social and political confrontations in real-life problems.
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